Work accidents and profesional diseases mutual corporations and temporary incapacity by common contingencies management: efficency versus adverse selection

Abstract

This article aims to analyse levels of efficiency in the management of temporary incapacity by common contingencies (ITCC) that reach the Mutual of accidents of work and professional diseases (MCSS) and the National Institute of Social Security (INSS). In it, update, deepen, and synthesize the main findings in a detailed investigation into this question driven by Professor Santos M. Ruesga.

For this purpose it was carried out a thorough review of applied law and the large figures of the sector, tracking possible explanations to the hypothetical differences in investigated management outcomes; now rules and data have been updated. And finally an econometric model was developed to interpret the hypothetical differences in the management of both entities regarding the probability of incurring ITCC and the extension of the period of economic benefit resulting from this contingency for the worker.

The model shows a bigger likely of a case of ITCC among workers in the INSS, due to labour and demographic characteristics. However, with homogeneous characteristic workers, the probability that a worker exceeds 15 days of ITCC is greater in MCSS than in the INSS. It is, summary, an analysis that reveals the possible presence of "adverse selection" processes rather than spurious relative efficiency in management by the MCSS.